Hong Kong, December 9 (ANI): It seems Japan can do nothing but annoy China at the moment. Whatever the field - whether it is diplomatic, cultural, trade or military - Beijing is finding something to criticise or complain about in connection to Japan.

Ironically, for a country that proudly maintains that it never interferes in the internal affairs of others, China is doing a sterling job of inserting itself into and attempting to shape Japanese affairs, including at the highest levels.

Take Xue Jian, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, for example, who threatened to 'behead' Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. On 8 November, he tweeted, 'The filthy head that recklessly sticks itself in must be cut off without a moment's hesitation.'

George Glass, the US Ambassador to Japan, quoted Xue's post two days later and added: 'The mask slips - again. Just a few months ago, [Xue] compared Israel with Nazi Germany. Now, he threatens Prime Minister [Takaichi] and the Japanese people. Time for Beijing to behave like the 'good neighbour' it talks repeatedly about - but fails repeatedly to become.'

Glass was simply highlighting the vast gulf between Chinese words and actions. Even as it vociferously pretends not to interfere in others' affairs, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is feverishly threatening leaders, manipulating media, leveraging Chinese expatriates overseas, micromanaging what foreign governments should or should not be saying, and issuing instructions through private messages to foreign leaders.

Relations between the two East Asian economic powerhouses of China and Japan have never been close, and the CCP assiduously brings up Japan's wartime past and the atrocities imperial Japan perpetrated. Yet what set off this new nadir was Takaichi responding to questions in the Japanese parliament on 7 November about any Chinese threat to Taiwan and how it would relate to Japanese interests.

Takaichi simply said Chinese 'warships with the use of military force' against Taiwan could lead to a 'survival-threatening situation' for Japan. There is no doubt this is true, but Beijing considered the Japanese leader's comments highly provocative. It construed her stance as suggesting that the Japan Self-Defence Force would therefore engage in collective self-defence activities if China attacks Taiwan.

After Takaichi's reply, Beijing's response was immediate. It demanded that Takaichi retract her remarks, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi went on to describe her words as 'shocking,' as Japan 'crossed a red line'. Such a stark warning is unprecedented for China. Of course, it is all quite ironic considering that China is itself willing to wield the threat of force against Taiwan to browbeat it into submission.

In the days that followed, China escalated its rhetoric and vindictiveness toward Japan in an orchestrated campaign. It has been signalling its displeasure in numerous ways. Bonny Lin and Kristi Govella of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the USA remarked, 'Analysis of similar periods of Japan-China tensions in 2010 and 2012 suggests that the current episode could lead to permanent changes in Japan-China relations, how each views the other, and the overall trajectory of their respective foreign policies. In particular, changing domestic political conditions will make it more difficult than before for both sides to de-escalate and push Japan to redouble efforts to reduce its dependence on China.'

Even though bilateral relations tend to stabilise after acerbic spats, their relationships never return to their previous status. Each time this public posturing happens, the new baseline lowers overall.

Two earlier periods of high tension related to a Chinese fishing boat ramming two Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands in 2010. Beijing had not sent government ships to the islands since the 1970s, but from 2010, its maritime enforcement law established a regular presence there. Similarly, Tokyo's purchase of the same Senkaku in 2012 spiked tensions.

As a further example, a Chinese frigate locked its fire control radar onto a Japanese destroyer and a helicopter in the East China Sea in 2013.

Discussing the causes of the current national dispute, Lin and Govella of the CSIS assessed, 'In many ways, Takaichi's remarks in the Diet reflected security concerns that Japanese politicians have increasingly discussed in recent years.

Nor did she specifically say that Japan would use military force to defend Taiwan or take any particular actions. In other words, it was a rather generalised response.

Indeed, her thoughts are nothing new. Compare what she said with the words that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe uttered after leaving office; he noted that 'a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan-US alliance'. Likewise, in 2021, former Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi said, 'The peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan.'

Furthermore, that same year, the then Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso warned, 'If a major problem tookplace in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation' for Japan.

Nonetheless, Beijing took offence at Takaichi's remarks in an official public setting. Such outbursts are quite normal for China, which is very thin-skinned when it comes to criticism.

Take Hong Kong's communist-controlled government, for example, which arrested several people after they petitioned for an independent investigation into the causes of a tragic seven-apartment-block fire that killed 159, with other victims still missing.

The people were arrested for sedition, the government soon warning about 'foreign forces, including anti-China media organisations', sowing discord, making 'malicious attacks' and 'slanderous remarks'. This typifies the paranoia of communist regimes, where the slightest hint of complaint is treated as an existential threat.

Returning to Sino-Japanese relations, 'Chinese officials and experts are concerned that Takaichi will loosen the restrictions on Japan's military use of force and its defence policy,' Lin and Govella believe.

This explains why they accused her of being the first Japanese leader since 1945 to promote the notion that 'a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, to explicitly link it to the exercise of collective self-defence, to express ambitions of a potential armed intervention in the Taiwan question, and to issue a military threat against China,' they explained.

A hallmark of Chinese foreign and domestic policy is the blame placed on Japan for World War II. After all, that was the premise for the military parade that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) held in Tiananmen Square on 3 September. The CCP has woven a narrative that glorifies the PLA and itself, and which demonises Japan. Such a notion serves as a nationalist rallying point and diverts people's attention from otherconcerns and problems closer to home.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Japan must 'face history squarely, reflect deeply upon its crimes of aggression, make a clean break with militarism and pursue the right path of peaceful development, good neighbourliness and friendship.'

Despite such de rigueur Chinese demands, the fact is that Japan has apologised for its wartime actions. Examples include Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's 1995 'heartfelt apology' and 'deep remorse' for colonial rule and aggression. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeated these sentiments in 2005, acknowledging 'tremendous damage and suffering'.

However, China remains unmollified, especially over emotive issues like the Nanjing Massacre and comfort women. To date, more than half a dozen Chinese government ministries have issued public statements lambasting Japan. Beyond that, China has instituted a global campaign.

For instance, Beijing sent two letters to the United Nations criticising Japan, and sought Russian and North Korean help to denounce Tokyo. At every opportunity, Beijing has sought to weaken Takaichi's ability to govern. So much for not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations!

As just one example, China's Ministry of Commerce warned on 4 December that 'Japan must bear sole responsibility for all consequences' if the prime minister does not withdraw her comments. The government encouraged private citizens to boycott travel to Japan, and it reinstated a ban on Japanese seafood products.

Japanese film releases have been delayed, and Japanese entertainers have been stopped in mid-concert in China and hustled offstage. Alarmingly, Lin and Govella noted, 'Diplomatically, China appears to be setting the stage to justify potential use of military force against Japan.

Beijing is falsely claiming that the UN Charter's 'enemy state clauses' - UN Charter Articles 53, 77 and 107 - allow founding UN members such as China to 'take direct military action if any of the former enemy states of World War II, including Japan, attempts to carry out a policy of aggression'.'

As Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs calmly and publicly reminded Beijing on X: 'Regarding the so-called 'enemy state' clauses in the Charter of the United Nations, a resolution recognising it as obsolete was adopted by an overwhelming majority at the 1995 UN General Assembly, with China itself casting a vote in favour.

Furthermore, at the 2005 UN World Summit, a General Assembly resolution was adopted stipulatingthe resolution of all member state leaders to delete references to 'enemy states' from the UN Charter, with China also joining the consensus. Posting information implying that obsolete clauses remain in effect is incompatible with decisions already made at the United Nations.'

This is typical of the kind of 'lawfare' China engages in. It pledges allegiance to international organisations like the UN, but at the snap of its fingers, it can twist their regulations or decisions to mean something entirely different if it serves its purpose, or even blithely ignore international law altogether.

After examining current Chinese actions so far, Lin and Govella predicted, 'Overall...China has left ample room for escalation.' They suggest areas such as cutting exports, sanctioning Japanese defence companies, disrupting Sino-Japanese trade, detaining Japanese citizens, and conducting military activities near places likeYonaguni Island (Japan's closest island to Taiwan) is ramping up paramilitary or military actions and establishing new norms of behaviour, and large-scale military exercises.

These are all options available to China if it wishes to up the ante, and there is ample scope for trade sanctions, such as restricting exports of rare earth minerals. The corollary is that Japan is likely to accelerate its self-reliance, apart from China, through episodes like this.

Dangerously, there is a military dimension to China's current posture, too. China's defence spokesperson said on 7 December, 'If Japan repeats its wrong path of militarism, it will surely fall into an irredeemable abyss.'

The PLA's military posturing has intensified. The latest cause for alarm was that, on two separate occasions, Chinese J-15 fighter jets flying from the aircraft carrier Liaoning intermittently locked their radars onto Japanese F-15J fighters over waters near Okinawa on 6 December. Such an action can be a precursor to launching missiles and is therefore considered escalatory.

Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said of the PLA's dangerous antics, 'Such actions go beyond what is necessary for safe flight and constitute dangerous behaviour. We lodged a strong protest with the Chinese side and firmly demanded measures to prevent such actions from occurring.'

In turn, China's Foreign Ministry blamed Japan for 'deliberately shadowing and harassing our operations, repeatedly sending aircraft into the exercise zone that China has designated and publicly announced'. Unfortunately, Chinese pilots have a track record of reckless and dangerous manoeuvres in close proximity to aircraft from other militaries.

Earlier, there was a confrontation between Chinese and Japanese law enforcement vessels near the Senkaku Islands (which China claims as the Diaoyu Islands). On 2 December, the China Coast Guard (CCG) claimed it warned off a Japanese fishing boat that had 'illegally entered the territorial waters of China's Diaoyu Dao'.

A spokesperson said the CCG took 'necessary law enforcement measures' and urged Japan to 'immediately stop all acts of infringement and provocation in these waters'.

Naturally, Japan had a very different perspective on the confrontation. The Japan Coast Guard said it approached Chinese vessels entering Japanese waters and demanded they leave, which they did several hours later.

With a wide range of tools at its disposal, China is explicitly showing its current displeasure with Japan. Apart from showing its propensity to throw temper tantrums, its actions also expose the lie that it does not interfere in others' affairs. (ANI)